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Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) outbreaks in inpatient settings are associated with poor outcomes in cancer
patients. The use of molecular epidemiology to document RSV transmission in the outpatient setting has not
been well described. We performed a retrospective cohort study of 2 nosocomial outbreaks of RSV at the
Seattle Cancer Care Alliance. Subjects included patients seen at the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance with RSV
detected in 2 outbreaks in 2007-2008 and 2012 and all employees with respiratory viruses detected in the
2007-2008 outbreak. A subset of samples was sequenced using semi-nested PCR targeting the RSV attach-
ment glycoprotein coding region. Fifty-one cases of RSV were identiﬁed in 2007-2008. Clustering of identical
viral strains was detected in 10 of 15 patients (67%) with RSV sequenced from 2007 to 2008. As part of
a multimodal infection control strategy implemented as a response to the outbreak, symptomatic employees
had nasal washes collected. Of 254 employee samples, 91 (34%) tested positive for a respiratory virus,
including 14 with RSV. In another RSV outbreak in 2012, 24 cases of RSV were identiﬁed; 9 of 10 patients
(90%) had the same viral strain, and 1 (10%) had another viral strain. We document spread of clonal strains
within an outpatient cancer care setting. Infection control interventions should be implemented in outpa-
tient, as well as inpatient, settings to reduce person-to-person transmission and limit progression of RSV
outbreaks.
 2014 American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.INTRODUCTION
Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) causes substantial
morbidity and mortality among hematopoietic stem cell
transplantation (HSCT) and oncology patients who are at
high risk for progression to lower respiratory tract infection
(LRTI)-associated respiratory failure and death [1]. Mortality
rates for RSV-associated LRTI range from 15% to 70% [2,3].
Treatment regimens for RSV-associated LRTI include aero-
solized ribavirin, often in combination with palivizumab or
intravenous immunoglobulin; supplemental oxygen; and
respiratory support [4-6]. However, antiviral therapies are
expensive, difﬁcult to administer, and have not reliably pre-
vented progression to LRTI [7,8]. With no available vaccine or
prophylaxis measures available for adults, infection control
practices remain the only effective method to limit RSV
outbreaks among adult cancer patients.
RSVmay be acquired in a health care setting and has been
implicated in outbreaks in inpatient hematology-oncology
and transplant wards [9]. Hospital-based outbreaks of RSVedgments on page 850.
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circulating community strains as well as nosocomial trans-
mission of identical viral strains [10]. The molecular epide-
miology of RSV is characterized by sequencing a hypervariable
region of the attachment (G) glycoprotein gene [11,12]. Evi-
dence of acquisition of the same viral strain in inpatient cancer
care settings has demonstrated the importance of speciﬁc
infection control policies to prevent nosocomial RSV trans-
mission, although data describing this in the outpatient
setting are not available [13]. Studies have shown outpatient
transmission of parainﬂuenza, a respiratory virus also asso-
ciated with high mortality in immunocompromised cancer
patients [14].
Efforts to enhance infection control to prevent RSV spread
include strict hand hygiene, use of droplet precautions,
cohorting of nursing staff, and symptom screening of em-
ployees and visitors [15,16]. Previous studies in inpatient set-
tings have shown that the number of RSV-positive cases
decreased after implementation of these infection control in-
terventions [17]. However, most cancer care is now delivered in
the outpatient setting. The routine use of antibiotic prophylaxis
and hematopoietic growth factors has reduced many risks
associated with prolonged neutropenia and prolonged hospital
stays [18]. It has been assumed that outpatients generally ac-
quire their respiratory infections in the community through
routine daily activities, such as work and exposure to children,
and not through contact within the health care setting. Few
data are currently available on transmission of RSV infection inTransplantation. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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virologic methods were used to demonstrate nosocomial
transmission of RSV during 2 RSV outbreaks at a large outpa-
tient cancer care center.
METHODS
The Seattle Cancer Care Alliance (SCCA) is an inpatient and outpatient
cancer care center based in Seattle, Washington. In 2012, 5599 patients were
treated for cancer at the SCCA over the course of 72,300 visits. Patients at the
SCCA are seen by teams of providers in different physical locations at a single
site, divided by type of cancer or therapy, designated as Teams A through F.
Allogeneic stem cell transplant recipients were seen by Teams A and B,
autologous stem cell transplants were seen by Team C, pediatric patients
were seen by Team D, patients in long-term follow-up were seen by Team E,
and hematology-oncology patients were seen by Team F providers. The
SCCA infection control team tracks incident RSV cases using an electronic
system that identiﬁes patients by provider team and location.
Electronic medical records were used to abstract sociodemographic and
clinical data for patients with RSV detected during the 2 outbreak periods.
Lymphopenia was deﬁned as 500 cells/mL and severe lymphopenia as
300 cells/mL. Respiratory specimens were obtained in patients for testing
by nasal washes or from bronchoalveolar lavage ﬂuid when clinically indi-
cated by the primary treatment team [19]. Direct ﬂuorescent antibody
detection was performed using RSV-speciﬁc mouse monoclonal antibodies
(Chemicon, Temecula, CA) on all nasal wash samples before January 21,
2008, and reverse transcriptase PCR was performed afterward at the Uni-
versity of Washington Virology Laboratories using previously published
methods [19,20]. All bronchoalveolar lavage samples undergo routine direct
testing for RSV using direct ﬂuorescent antibody, shell vial culture, and/or
reverse transcriptase PCR testing.
During the 2007-2008 outbreak, all employees at the SCCA were
administered a daily 12-symptom respiratory screening paper questionnaire
for presence of runny nose, sinus congestion/stuffy nose, postnasal drip,Figure 1. Histogram of all RSV cases at the SCCA per day in the 2007-2008 outbreak (A
cases at the SCCA per day in the 2012 outbreak (C) and only cases where the viral str
season. The pattern of the box represents the team of providers seen by the patient.shortness of breath, cough, wheezing or chest tightness, sputum production,
sore throat, sneezing, watery eyes, ear pain, or fever (temperature>100.4F)
and had a nasal wash collected for respiratory viral testing per institutional
policy at the time. Testing for RSV and 11 other respiratory viruses, including
inﬂuenza A and B, human metapneumovirus, parainﬂuenza 1-4, rhinovirus,
human coronavirus groups 1 and 2, and bocavirus were performed on
employee samples using previously published methods [19,21]. Employees
who had a positive nasal wash for any respiratory virus were not permitted
to return to work until complete resolution of all symptoms and clearance
by Occupational Health. To compare the outbreak with community data,
rates of RSV detected in community samples from the Seattle and Paciﬁc
Northwest region were obtained from the University of Washington Diag-
nostic Virology Laboratory database (http://depts.washington.edu/rspvirus/
respiratory.htm).
Sequencing was attempted from residual RSV-positive samples from the
2 respiratory seasons using a semi-nested PCR protocol targeting the second
hypervariable region of the attachment glycoprotein coding region [22].
Random residual de-identiﬁed RSV-positive community samples collected
from subjects seeking medical care during the same respiratory seasons
were also sequenced to serve as control subjects. Sequences were submitted
to GenBank with accession numbers KC565494 to KC565526. Sociodemo-
graphic, clinical, and virologic data were analyzed using Stata 12.0 (STATA
Corp, College Station, TX). Nucleotide sequences for 233 and 212 base pair
regions of the second hypervariable region of the RSV attachment glyco-
protein coding region were aligned using ClustalX2 [23].
Phylogenetic trees were constructed separately for the 2007-2008 and
2012 outbreaks using MEGA5 with evolutionary distances calculated using
the maximum likelihood method with 1000 bootstrap replicates [24]. This
was performed using the Tamura-Nei model. The tree with the highest log
likelihood is shown.When the number of common siteswas 100 or less than
one-fourth of the total number of sites, the maximum parsimony method
was used; otherwise, the BioNJ method with MCL distance matrix was used.
The trees were drawn to scale, with branch lengths measured in the number
of substitutions per site.) and only cases where the viral strain was sequenced (B). Histogram of all RSV
ain was sequenced (D). The asterisk represents an identical viral strain for that
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gaps and missing data were eliminated. A total of 233 positions was
included in the data set for the 2007 tree and 212 positions in the data set for
the 2012 tree. Reference and community sequences were included in the
comparison. Community samples included were sequences obtained from
community childcare attendees from November 2006 to March 2009 and
from random residual de-identiﬁed samples collected from adult and pe-
diatric inpatients at the University of Washington and Seattle Children’s
Hospital form November to March of each RSV season in the Paciﬁc
Northwest from 2006 to 2009 and 2011 to 2012. Ethical approval for the
study was obtained from the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
Institutional Review Board.
RESULTS
RSV Outbreak 2007-2008
In November 2007, a cluster of 3 RSV cases at the SCCA
prompted the implementation of an active respiratory virus
surveillance system (Figure 1A). This plan designated
3 levels of infection control measures (Figure 2), with the
immediate enforcement of Level 3 precautions starting
January 1, 2008 (Figure 1A). As part of this plan, all patients,
staff, and visitors to the clinic were screened for the pres-
ence of respiratory symptoms in the prior week using theFigure 2. Our Respiratory Virus Management Plan was implemented January 1, 2008
and infection control strategies.12-symptom respiratory screening questionnaire. Symp-
tomatic persons were placed in respiratory isolation and a
nasal wash for respiratory virus testing was collected. Of 51
cases of RSV identiﬁed in patients, 42 (82%) patients were
HSCT recipients and 9 (18%) had hematologic or solid organ
malignancies (Table 1). In the week before RSV detection,
33 patients (65%) were seen only in the outpatient clinic,
whereas 7 (14%) were hospitalized and 11 (22%) had no
associated health care visits. One of 11 subjects with no
associated health care visits attended childcare; the others
did not indicate recent sick contacts.
Our institutional policy for RSV treatment during this time
included the administration of inhaled ribavirin to prevent
progression of RSV upper respiratory tract infection to LRTI in
patientswith severe lymphopenia and the use of palivizumab
or intravenous immunoglobulin for documented RSV-
associated LRTI. Lymphocyte counts were measured within
1 week of RSV detection in 47 patients; 14 (30%) were lym-
phopenic and 8 (17%) had severe lymphopenia. Only 4 (8%)
were diagnosed with LRTI. Fifteen patients (29%) received
ribavirin alone or in combination with intravenousand included designation of 3 tiers of heightened respiratory viral surveillance
Table 1
Sociodemographic and Clinical Characteristics of Patients with RSV Detected
in the 2007-2008 and 2012 Outbreaks
Characteristics 2007-2008
Outbreak [n (%)]
2012
Outbreak [n (%)]
Patients 51 (68%) 24 (32%)
Median age, yr (range) 53 (2-75) 58 (8-69)
Women 25 (49) 14 (58)
Underlying condition
Malignancy 9 (18) 5 (21)
HSCT recipient 42 (82) 19 (79)
Lymphopenia (500 cells/mL)* 14 (30) 10 (59)
Severe lymphopenia (300 cells/mL)* 8 (17) 6 (35)
Health care location
Hospital 7 (14) 3 (13)
Clinic 33 (65) 15 (63)
No associated health care visits 11 (22) 6 (25)
Specimen type
Nasal wash 48 (94) 24 (100)
Bronchoalveolar lavage 3 (6) 0 (0)
Ribavirin treatment 15 (29) 3 (13)
LRTI diagnosis 4 (8) 1 (4)
Follow-up testing performed 23 (45) 19 (79)
Repeat testing positive 7 (30) 7 (37)
Clinical outcome
Survival 47 (92) 24 (100)
Death due to other causes 3 (6) 0 (0)
Death attributed to RSV 1 (2) 0 (0)
HSCT indicates hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipient; LRTI, lower
respiratory tract infection; RSV, respiratory syncytial virus.
* Lymphocyte count available within 1 week of RSV detection for 47
patients in the 2007-2008 outbreak and 17 patients in the 2012 outbreak.
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tients (45%) had repeat testing performed amedian of 13 days
later (range, 4 to 32 days) with 7 (30%) having detectable
virus. One patient (2%) died due to RSV pneumonia, 3 (6%)
died of other causes, and 47 (92%) survived.
Fifty-one cases of RSV were observed over 131 days in the
2007-2008 outbreak (0.39 RSV cases per day; Figure 1A).
Residual samples from 19 of 51 patients (37%) in the 2007-
2008 outbreak were available for sequencing; 15 outbreak
samples (29%) were successfully sequenced, as well as an
additional 13 community samples. These included 14 sub-
type A strains and 1 subtype B strain. During the 2007-2008
outbreak, illness episodes with sequenced samples did not
differ by patient age (P¼ .28) or location of care (P¼ .43) from
those unable to be sequenced, although sequenced samples
were collected later in the epidemic (P ¼ .01).
Of the 15 illness episodes sequenced, 10 (67%) were
identical, spanning a 43-day period from November 28, 2007
to January 9, 2008 (Figure 1B). Nine of these patients were
hospitalized or seen in the clinic in the 7 days before RSV
detection, whereas 1 patient had no associated prior health
care visits. The ﬁrst patient with this strain was a pediatric
outpatient seen by Team D providers, and the next was seen
by Team B providers 5 days later. Of the 10 cases with
identical viral strains, only the index case was seen by Team
D providers, whereas 3 patients were seen by Team A and 5
by Team B providers. Two of these patients subsequently
died with RSV pneumonia as a contributing, although not the
primary, cause of their death.
Three other distinct viral strains co-circulated during the
outbreak period. One cluster of 2 patients was seen by Team
B providers in a 4-day period. In another cluster of 2 patients,
1 was seen in December 2007 by Team B providers and
another was seen in February 2008 by Team E providers. No
clear epidemiologic link was noted for these 2 patients. One
patient seen by Team A providers in December 2007 had adistinct viral strain, similar to circulating community strains
from 2009.
Employees with RSV detected included 1 Team D and 1
Team A provider and 2 who provided care across multiple
teams. Employee samples were not saved and therefore not
available for sequencing from the 2007-2008 outbreak. The
volume of patients seen in the clinic remained constant
during the outbreak period, with an average of 1909 patient-
days during weekdays and 341 patient-days during week-
ends (Figure 3A).
RSV Outbreak 2012
In March 2012, a cluster of 24 RSV cases was observed in
the outpatient clinic (Figure 1C). Baseline sociodemographic
and clinical data were similar to those of the patients in the
2007-2008 outbreak (Table 1). One patient (4%) had a diag-
nosis of LRTI; 3 patients (13%), all with URTI, received riba-
virin to prevent progression to LRTI. Eleven of 24 patients
(46%) were epidemiologically linked to a single outpatient
care team (Team A) over 4 weeks. Although Level 2 pre-
cautions had been implemented since January, the Infection
Control Team noted they had not been strictly enforced.
Speciﬁcally, staff with active respiratory symptoms
continued to work in the clinic, visitors/staff were not using
the screening stickers consistently, and patients with docu-
mented respiratory virus symptoms were not tested imme-
diately. On April 3, 2012, the Infection Control Team strictly
enforced Level 2 precautions by sending a bulletin to all staff
members detailing concerns regarding RSV, increasing
outpatient rounds to occur on a daily basis during the week,
and implemented education to re-engage staff. Level 3 pre-
cautions were not implemented in the 2012 outbreak.
Samples from21 of 24 patients (88%) in the 2012 outbreak
were available for sequencing; 10 of these outbreak samples
(48%) were successfully sequenced, as well as 8 community
samples from the same time period. An identical RSV sub-
type A strain was detected in 9 of 10 patients (90%) during a
27-day period between March 23, 2012 and April 19, 2012
(Figure 1D), whereas a distinct subtype B viral strain was
detected in 1 patient (10%). Seven of these patients with
identical strains were seen in the clinic or hospitalized,
whereas 2 had no associated health care visits. Six were seen
by Team A, 2 by Team F, and 1 by Team C providers. A patient
with a unique viral strain was seen by Team A providers on
March 27, 2012. Phylogenetic analysis of the viral strains
demonstrated clustering of samples within each outbreak
distinct from community samples from the same season
(Figures 4 and 5).
In 2012, the numbers of patients seen in the clinic aver-
aged 3128 patient-days during weekdays and 659 patient-
days during weekends (Figure 3B). Overall, 1015 employees
worked in the outpatient oncology clinic during the 2007-
2008 outbreak compared with 1459 employees during the
2012 outbreak. The number of community-acquired RSV
cases in the Paciﬁc Northwest region as detected at the
University ofWashington Clinical Virology Laboratory during
the 5-season period from 2007 to 2012 remained stable
(median, 713 RSV cases per season; range, 610 to 804 cases;
http://depts.washington.edu/rspvirus/respiratory.htm),
although no RSV outbreaks were observed in the SCCA in the
intervening years.
Employee Testing Results
Of the daily symptom screenings conducted in 1015 em-
ployees who worked during the 2007-2008 outbreak, 254
Figure 3. Chart of RSV cases per day during the outbreak as compared with numbers of patients seen and numbers of community RSV cases in the Paciﬁc Northwest
Region for the (A) 2007-2008 season and (B) 2011-2012 season. The bars represent the numbers of RSV-positive cases at the SCCA clinic. The dotted line represents
the number of patients (in multiples of 1000) seen at the SCCA clinic. The dashed line represents the numbers of community cases in the Paciﬁc Northwest.
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nasal wash. Ninety-one nasal wash samples (34%) had at
least 1 respiratory virus detected, including 14 samples (15%)
with RSV. Multiple other respiratory viruses detected in
employees included humanmetapneumovirus (n¼ 12; 13%),
inﬂuenza A (n ¼ 14; 15%), inﬂuenza B (n ¼ 13; 14%), coro-
navirus (n ¼ 18; 20%), parainﬂuenza type 1 (n ¼ 2; 2%), and
parainﬂuenza type 3 (n ¼ 2; 2%). Twelve employees had RSV
detected from December 20, 2007 to March 13, 2008, with
2 employees positive on repeat testing. Ten (83%) had direct
patient contact; 4 of these worked in the transplant or
oncology departments. The ﬁrst employeewith RSV detected
had no direct contact with patients with documented RSV,
although she had been symptomatic since early December
with an upper respiratory illness. Of the 12 employees with
RSV, only 1 had contact with a patient with documented RSV.
However, transmission between the employee and patient
seemed unlikely because the timing of symptom onset
and diagnosis dates did not indicate an epidemiologic link
between the 2 cases.DISCUSSION
Molecular sequencing of RSV strains detected during
2 distinct outbreaks from patients attending a large outpa-
tient cancer care center demonstrated circulation of identical
viral strains, suggesting the outpatient clinic can serve as a
source of nosocomially acquired respiratory infections. In our
center, outpatients are seen by multiple providers in com-
mon locations, engage in on-site meetings with other pa-
tients, providers, and families, and continue to work and
interact with others outside of the medical setting. Tradi-
tional infection control interventions shown to be effective in
hospital settings, such as the use of strict respiratory isola-
tion and limitation of visitors and staff, may not be as
effective as in the inpatient setting due to multiple potential
sources to introduce infection [17]. Contact tracing is also
more difﬁcult in outpatient environments, making it harder
to identify patterns of transmission.
Traditionally, cancer care has been delivered to inpatients
until neutrophil recovery and clinical improvement. How-
ever, early discharge followed by continued outpatient
Figure 4. Phylogenetic trees were constructed using sequenced samples from
the 2 outbreaks. The outbreak strains are identiﬁed by year followed by pro-
vider team. The reference and community strains are labeled with year fol-
lowed by reference strain (RS) or community strain (CS). The numbers at the
nodes are the bootstrap values. This phylogenetic tree shows the sequenced
samples from the 2007-2008 outbreak. Of the 15 outbreak strains, 14 were
subtype A and 1 was subtype B. The tree with the highest log likelihood
(e1047.02) is shown. Community samples were collected during RSV season in
the Seattle region from November to April from inpatients at Seattle Children’s
Hospital and the University of Washington, as well as community childcare
attendees.
Figure 5. Phylogenetic trees were constructed using sequenced samples from
the 2 outbreaks. The outbreak strains are identiﬁed by year followed by pro-
vider team. The reference and community strains are labeled with year fol-
lowed by reference strain (RS) or community strain (CS). The numbers at the
nodes are the bootstrap values. This phylogenetic tree shows the sequenced
samples from the 2012 outbreak. Of the 10 outbreak strains, 9 were subtype A
and 1 was subtype B. The tree with the highest log likelihood (e905.54)
outbreak is shown. Community samples were collected during RSV season in
the Seattle region from November to April from inpatients at Seattle Children’s
Hospital and the University of Washington, as well as community childcare
attendees.
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Delivering care as an outpatient has multiple advantages,
including cost savings, improved quality of life, and poten-
tially reduction of nosocomial infections [25,26]. However,
many of these patients are seen routinely in outpatient
clinics such as ours, where they continue to interact with
health care providers and other patients on a regular basis.
Few prior studies have examined nosocomial transmission of
respiratory viral infections in the outpatient setting. A study
by Nichols et al. [27] conducted at our institution docu-
mented outpatient transmission of parainﬂuenza virus, and a
small study by Machado et al. [10] documented clusters of
identical RSV strains in an HSCT inpatient and outpatient
treatment center in Sao Paolo, Brazil. The Brazilian study
used direct ﬂuorescent antibody for RSV diagnosis, a much
less sensitive technique that likely limited the sensitivity of
detection of RSV among the patients.In response to the RSV outbreak in 2007-2008, we
implemented intervention strategies based on Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention guidelines for inpatient
infection control settings, with interventions including staff
cohorting, employee screening, and hand hygiene [28-30]. In
an inpatient study by Lavergne et al. [17], measures that
included restriction of visitors with respiratory symptoms,
droplet isolation precautions, and use of gowns, gloves, and
masks by all patients, staff, and visitors were associated with
a .09 relative risk of RSV as compared with a more traditional
infection control policy. The interventions we implemented
in an outpatient setting including heightened symptom
surveillance of employees, visitors, and patients at every
entry point to the clinic and the strict restriction from access
to the clinic based on a positive symptom screen, use of
gowns and gloves, and droplet isolation precautions of all
clinic patients with respiratory symptoms. We observed that
the number of new cases decreased after the intervention in
2008 despite continued high levels of community RSV
H.Y. Chu et al. / Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 20 (2014) 844e851850activity as well as steady numbers of patient visits at the
SCCA, suggesting that implementation of our strategy was
effective in reducing the magnitude of the outbreak. In 2012,
the magnitude of the outbreak was limited due to strict
reinforcement of Level 2 precautions rather than escalation
to Level 3 precautions. It is possible that Level 3 precautions
would not have been necessary in 2008 if heightened
enforcement of Level 2 precautions had been strictly
enforced at that time as well.
In the 2007-2008 outbreak, a respiratory virus was
identiﬁed in one third of employees with respiratory symp-
toms, including 12 with RSV. Detection of respiratory viruses
in symptomatic staff, including high-risk pathogens such as
RSV, inﬂuenza, parainﬂuenza, and metapneumovirus, in-
dicates multiple opportunities for staff to introduce com-
munity respiratory viruses into an outpatient clinic. All these
respiratory viruses have been associated with inpatient
nosocomial outbreaks and have the potential to cause severe
disease in immunocompromised patients [31-33]. Strict
policies restricting symptomatic staff from working may
mitigate the potential impact of provider transmission as the
source of nosocomial outbreaks.
A study limitation is that we were unable to sequence
most samples from the 2 outbreaks. Many samples were
inadvertently discarded at the end of the RSV season and
were not available for sequencing, including all employee
samples. Possibilities for the inability to sequence the
remainder of the samples include low viral loads and sample
degradation. In the 2007-2008 outbreak in particular, only
samples early in the outbreak were sequenced. It is therefore
not possible to know whether the cases later in the season
were due to continued transmission of the outbreak strain or
to sporadic community cases. Additionally, no samples were
collected from visitors or family members. These data may
have provided additional information regarding the degree
of clonal transmission by health care providers and family
members in the outbreaks. We also acknowledge no clear
epidemiologic data linking outbreak cases. However, in our
center, there are multiple sites of potential interaction be-
tween patients and care providers, including radiology,
phlebotomy, and waiting areas for clinics. Although not
documented, we believe these interactions may provide
potential exposures of patients to sick employees, and vice
versa. It is also possible that the clustering of the RSV strains
during the 2 outbreaks was a reﬂection of the dominant
strain circulating during the season in the region. The mo-
lecular epidemiology of RSV usually involves 1 dominant
strain that circulates over the course of a season [34,35].
However, we found clustering of samples from both out-
breaks distinct from co-circulating community strains
collected during the same period, making this less likely.
Increased sampling and detection during periods of the RSV
outbreak may have been partially due to heightened
awareness among providers, leading to potential sampling
bias. Further, although we observed decreases in numbers of
new cases after implementation of our infection control plan,
wewere unable to document efﬁcacy of the intervention due
to the retrospective observational nature of the study.
Molecular sequencing was useful in identifying potential
modes of nosocomial spread of RSV in an outpatient cancer
care center during 2 separate RSV outbreaks. Infection con-
trol interventions used traditionally in inpatient settings
should be considered for implementation in outpatient
cancer settings to reduce person-to-person transmission and
limit progression of RSV outbreaks.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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